RECENT CASES
Practice-Appeal by Defendant to Whom New Trial Has Been Granted-[Ohio].The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's testimony and
at the close of the entire evidence. Both motions were overruled and a verdict returned
for plaintiff by the jury. The defendant then moved for judgment and for a new trial.
The defendant's motion for judgment was overruled but his motion for a new trial was
granted, on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. No
judgment was at any time rendered for either party in the trial court. The defendant
appealed, citing as error the overruling of his motions for a directed verdict and for
judgment after verdict. Held (one judge dissenting), the order granting a new trial
was a final order which would support an appeal from errors in the trial by the defendant to whom it was granted. Michigan-Ohio-Indiana Coal Ass'n v.Nigh, 131
Ohio St. 405, 3 N.E. (2d) 355 (1936).

The statement of the dissenting judge that an order granting a new trial was not a
final order sufficient to support an appeal was in accord with earlier Ohio decisions and
with decisions of other jurisdictions. Continental Trust Co. v. Home Fuel & Supply Co.,
99 Ohio St. 453, 126 N.E. 5o8 (igig); Huff v. PennsylvaniaR.R. Co., 127 Ohio St. 94,
187 N.E. i (i933); Hunt v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 333 (C.C.A. ioth 1931). But two
recent Ohio per curiam decisions held an order granting a new trial a final order.
Hocking Valley Mining Co. v. Hunter, 130 Ohio St. 333, 199 N.E. 184 (i935); CincinnatiGoodwill Industries v. Neuerman, 13o Ohio St. 334, i99 N.E. 178 (1935). See also Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. I10, § 201, Ill. C. P. A. 1933, § 77.
The court in the principal case insisted that granting a new trial to the defendant
should not preclude him from appealing from the overruling of his motion for a
directed verdict. The objection to allowing such appeal by the defendant after he has
moved for and obtained a new trial is that he is thereby afforded too great an opportunity to delay action in the case without any detriment other than the costs of appeal.
And by so delaying he may force the plaintiff to accept a relatively unfavorable settlement.
Where an order granting a new trial is not a final order, it is clear that no appeal can
be taken from error in the trial by the party to whom a new trial is granted. Bloomberg v. Bloomberg, 148 Wash. 638, 269 Pac. 852 (1928); Wolfe v. City of Miami, 1r4 Fla.
238, 54 So. i96 (1934). In Iowa the appellate court (on an appeal raising the sufficiency of the evidence) usually remands for a new trial only, even though it feels that
the trial court should have directed a verdict or given final judgment. i Iowa Bar
Rev. 57 (i935). And in the federal courts, the jury's return of a verdict for one party
precludes the entry of a final judgment for the other party even though the court admits that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Slocum v. New York
L. Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913); cf. Baltimore v. Rediman, 295 U.S. 654 (i935); see also
Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, rule 56 (prelim. draft 1936). Again
while a statute seems to provide for final judgment on appeal from the granting of a
new trial, Pennsylvania courts have been very reluctant to upset the ruling granting
a new trial. See Purdon's Penn. Stats. 1931, tit. 12, § 682; March v. PhiladelphiaCo.,
285 Pa. 413, 132 Adt. 355 (1926).
The Indiana courts have suggested that the defendant in moving for a new trial has
elected not to pursue his remedy for the overruling of his motion for judgment non
obstante veredicto. See Lousiville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N.E. 343 (1894);
King v. Inlanu Steel Co., 177 Ind. 201, 96 N.E. 337 (igii); Evansville Ry. Co. v. Cook-
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sey, 63 Ind. App. 482, 112 N.E. 541 (1916). Manifestly, however, there can be no
election when a motion for a new trial is a prerequisite to appeal from the errors complained of. The "election" theory would therefore be inapplicable in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lavene v. Friedrich'sAdm'r, 186 Ind. 333, 115 N.E. 324 (1917); Gorrell
v. South's Adm'r, 26o Ky. 28, 83 S.W. (2d) 518 (1925); Elfers v. Schuff, 127 Neb. 236,
254 N.W. 885 (1934); Dawson v. Cohn, 172 Okla. 28, 43 P. (2d) 1034 (1935). In Ohio,

however, a motion for a new trial is not a prerequisite to an appeal from the overruling
of a motion for a directed verdict. Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, 118 Ohio St.
lo6, 16o N.E. 629 (1928); Inglish v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 125 Ohio St. 494,
182 N.E. 31 (1932). Thus in the principal case, at first sight it might be urged that the
defendant by seeking a new trial elected to waive the error in overruling his motion for
a directed verdict. But in Ohio at the time of this case a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto raised only the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the sufficiency of the
evidence. Throckmorton's Ohio Ann. Code 1934, § 116oi; changed by Ohio L. 1935,
p. 413. And in Lehman v. Harvey (45 Ohio App. 215, 187 N.E. 28 (I933)) the court
held (possiblyby way of dictum) that if a motion for a new trial is made in conjunction
with a motion for judgment, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is
thereby raised and the trial court may grant final judgment. See 9 U. of Cin. L. Rev.
67 (I935). Thus the defendant's motion for a new trial is more properly interpreted as
an attempt to obtain final judgment in the trial court in the present proceeding rather
than an election to rely on his new trial and waive appeal. Cf.Barker v. BarkerArtesian
Well, 45 R.I. 297, 121 Atl. 117 (1923) (defendant having been granted a conditional
new trial appealed before plaintiff failed to make remittitur within a specified time;
court did not rely on conditional nature of new trial, however).
Should the problem in the principal case arise again in Ohio, the passage of a recent
statute (Ohio L. 1935, P. 413) may well lead the court to the opposite conclusion. This
statute allows the trial court to grant final judgment on a motion for judgment non
obstante veredicto if the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict returned by the
jury. Thus a motion for a new trial could not be interpreted as a necessary attempt to
obtain final judgment and, by the "election" theory, if the defendant's motion for a
new trial is granted, he should be confined to this remedy.

